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HEADING 1
INTRODUCTION AND MY POSITIONING
As someone who has lived in or been connected to Catalonia (a region, a nation, and an
autonomous community, in northeast Spain, Figure 1) for 29 years, I watched with trepidation as
the pro-independence movement came to a head on October 1, 2017. On that date, a referendum
on independence was held by the Catalan government, even though it had been declared illegal
by the Spanish government. There have long been yearnings for independence among some
Catalans, but in the first 20 years or so after Spain emerged from the Franco dictatorship (19391975), the Spanish government had managed to give this region enough authorities to keep these
sentiments in check. However, when Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s conservative government
(2011-2018) started stripping Catalonia of these authorities in an overt effort to “Spanishize” it,
some Catalan politicians and members of civil society began to push in earnest for independence
and create both a rhetoric and mass actions to build momentum around the pro-independence
movement.

Figure 1. Map of Spain. Catalonia is the orange region in the northeast (upper right).
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This paper examines five documentaries made over the course of eight years, from 2010
to 2018, with the goals of tracing how the arguments on Catalonia’s independence from Spain
evolved to culminate in the “illegal” referendum, identifying the counter-discourses from
Spanish nationalists, and examining the referendum itself, which sheds light on the connection
between nation-building and ritual. The first three documentaries are from before the referendum
held on October 1, 2017 (henceforth, 1-O, as it is called in Catalonia): two were created by TV3,
the Catalan public television channel as part of its program Sense Ficció in 2010 and 2013; they
essentially espouse arguments as to why independence makes sense and is feasible, clearly on
the Catalanist side. The other one was produced by a pro-Spain group in Catalonia called
Sociedad Civil Catalana in 2016 and features interviews with anti-independence and antiCatalanist Catalans who felt intimidated by the surge in Catalanist sentiments. The last two
documentaries are from 2018, one year after the referendum, and they primarily show footage of
it; one purports to be a neutral account of that day, while the other was made one year afterward,
with a clear urge to revive the horror and yet poignancy of the events that transpired that day.
I start with a historical overview of Catalonia and Spain that provides a backdrop to the
current situation. I then discuss the two documentaries from 2010 and 2013, which were laying
the groundwork for the future independence referendum. After that, I summarize the antiCatalanist video and also situate it within the debate on what constitutes nationalism: the
Catalanists who want their own nation-state or the Spaniards who want Spanish cultural
assimilation? I then discuss the last two documentaries from after the referendum. Throughout
this discussion, I not only situate the documentaries ideologically and theoretically but also
discuss some of the filmic techniques used to support the agenda of each video. Finally, in the
last two sections, I connect all five documentaries to different forms and versions of nationalism
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and identify elements of ritual found in the two documentaries from after the referendum. In the
conclusion, I attempt to summarize the issues and dilemmas raised by these documentaries.
To be transparent about my own position on this issue, I should state that I speak both
Catalan and Spanish and have Catalan family members and friends of all political stripes in
Catalonia and Spain. I personally sympathize with some Catalans’ yearning to shed the yoke of
Spain, which they perceive as less authentic (as a “nation of nations,” a modern, invented
pastiche) and more centrist, absolutist, and backwards than Catalonia (I agree with the latter
position). However, I do not believe that independence would necessarily benefit Catalans.
Furthermore, given the fact that many Catalans and/or residents of Catalonia are not actually in
favor of independence, I doubt the prospect has much real potential at this point in time,
especially since Rajoy was ousted and subsequent leaders are more moderate and willing to
engage in dialogue. Finally, however, I do believe that Spain should allow Catalonia to hold a
referendum on independence, just as the U.K., Denmark, and Canada have allowed Scotland,
Greenland, and Quebec to do, although I believe this bid is likely to fail and would thus lay to
rest—at least temporarily—these independence claims. I also believe that Spain’s strong-arm
tactics on 1-O unwittingly unveiled the fact that the conservative heirs to the Franco dictatorship
are distressingly alive and well in Spain.
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HEADING 2
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In line with Benedict Anderson’s assertion that despite the fact that “nation” is a modern
concept, it is built upon a purportedly ancient past (Anderson 1983), Catalans date their
nationhood back to the eleventh century with the first Count of Barcelona, Guifré el Pelós
(Wilfred the Hairy), who reigned over the entire Spanish March (a buffer zone between
Charlemagne’s territories north of the Pyrenees and the Moors on the Iberian Peninsula). Under
various geographic and power configurations, Catalonia retained its own rule even when the
Crowns of Aragon-Catalonia and Castile merged in 1469 via the marriage of Isabella and
Ferdinand, who later went down in history for financing Christopher Columbus’s voyage to the
“New World” (Sabaté 2010). In this dynastic union, which “created a joint Spanish state but not
a unified nation” (Payne 1971), each state retained its own laws and customs, a delicate balance
that remained in place until centuries later, when Charles II died without heirs in 1700,
unleashing the War of the Spanish Succession, in which the European powers vied for hegemony
over Spain.
The Catalans supported the losing Habsburgs, and in the new centrist Bourbon monarchy
the Catalan-Aragonese institutions were abolished and the Catalan language was banned for the
first time in education, the public administration, and legal matters (Vila-Pujol 2007). Barcelona
resisted defeat during a one-year siege, a source of pride even today; somewhat paradoxically,
this defeat became not only Catalonia’s national day but the source of its anthem, Els Segadors
(The Reapers, after that conflict, which is locally called the Reapers’ War). Yet the power
dynamics in Spain shifted with the Industrial Revolution in the mid-nineteenth century.
Catalonia was among the first regions to industrialize, bringing it power and prestige and giving
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it the impetus to standardize Catalan and make it a language of culture and literacy through the
annual Jocs Florals poetry/prose contest and a burgeoning series of Catalan-language
newspapers and books within the Catalan cultural and national Renaixença, “a rebirth of Catalan
vernacular literature [whose roots] were part of the general awakening of romantic cultural
nationalism and regionalism found in widely scattered parts of Europe” (Payne 1971). This laid
the groundwork for the standardized language and print capitalism that Anderson views as the
bedrock of nationalism, and indeed dovetails with the period when the first Catalanist
movements emerged, marked by the first Catalan-language newspaper, El Diari Català,
published by Valentí Almirall in 1880, and his book Lo Catalanisme, “the first categorical
expression of political Catalanism” (Payne 1971), in 1886.
Despite achieving institutions of self-governance such as the Mancomunitat
(Commonwealth) in the early twentieth century, the outcome of the Spanish Civil War (19361939), with Catalonia once again on the losing side, put an end to any vocal claims on behalf of
Catalan language and culture, which were harshly repressed by the Franco dictatorship for
approximately 40 years. Simultaneously, because Catalonia remained an economic powerhouse
within Spain, Castilian-speaking “immigrants” from other regions flooded into Catalonia,
particularly the main cities such as Barcelona, in the search for jobs and a more prosperous life
(Vila-Pujol 2007).
At the end of the dictatorship, with the 1978 Spanish Constitution and Catalonia’s Statute
of Autonomy, Catalonia regained some measure of independence in matters like education, the
media, healthcare, and the local police force, and it implemented successful cultural and
linguistic revitalization efforts after four decades of repression, leading to widespread knowledge
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and use of the language that had been repressed and only kept alive within families and in
underground circles for four decades. The delicate balance between Catalonia and Spain has
taken another turn since 2005 with the Catalonian Parliament’s desire to enact a new Statute of
Autonomy, which would expand the regional government’s powers, recognize Catalonia as a
nation (within Spain), and give the Catalan language primacy over Castilian in Catalonia
(Politico 2018). In 2010, the new Statute of Autonomy was largely rejected by the Constitutional
Court of Spain, leading to the first mass demonstration in Barcelona with the slogan “Som una
nació. Nosaltres decidim!” (We are a nation. We decide!). Further demonstrations ensued the
next year after the election of a new conservative, (Spanish) nationalist Prime Minister, Mariano
Rajoy, whose government continued to encroach on Catalonia’s spheres of autonomy and deny
the rhetoric of Catalonia as a nation, further exacerbating tensions and heightening proindependence sentiments.
In 2015, a new Catalan president, Carles Puigdemont, was elected on a largely proindependence platform. In 2017, the Catalonian Parliament officially called for a referendum on
secession from Spain to be held on October 1 of that year. Spain’s Constitutional Court ordered
the referendum suspended, yet it was indeed held on October 1, 2017, with 43% voter turnout
and over 90% in favor of independence (Frost 2008). It should be noted that many eligible voters
who identify more with Spain than Catalonia did not vote because the Constitutional Court had
declared the election illegal, so it would be inaccurate to say that 90% of Catalan voters wanted
Catalonia to be an independent country. Yet at the same time, many voters who had not planned
to vote changed their minds at the last minute when they watched with outrage as the Spanish
government sent a shipload and caravans of heavily armed Guardia Civil (a Spanish paramilitary
police corps) to Barcelona to seize the ballots, stop the voting, and close the polling stations. On
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the day of the referendum, the Guardia Civil unleashed violence against nonviolent voters and
poll organizers, which went viral in the social media as it was happening. Indeed, Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International both claimed excess force was used during the election, while
on the following days, unapologetic for the violence, King Felipe of Spain called the Catalan
voters “disloyal” to the country, and pro-independence leaders were jailed or went into exile.
This is the backdrop to the documentaries I watched of the events before, during, and after 1-O.
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HEADING 3
FIRST SET OF DOCUMENTARIES: SETTING THE STAGE BEFORE THE
REFERENDUM
I discovered the first two documentaries, one from 2010 and one from 2013, in Kathryn
Crameri’s book Goodbye Spain? The Question of Independence for Catalonia (2014). Given the
date of this book, it was clearly written in the throes of Catalonia’s clashes with the
Constitutional Court over the new proposed Statute of Autonomy, and just before Puigdemont
was elected president of Catalonia with an overtly pro-independence platform. Therefore,
Crameri bears witness to the surge in pro-independence sentiment and probes the roots of that
sentiment and the arguments bandied in favor of independence. The two videos she references
which I watched are called Adéu Espanya? (Goodbye Spain?) and Hola, Europa! (Hello
Europe!). They were both produced by the program Sense Ficció on TV3, the Catalan
government-sponsored channel, and they are both exclusively in Catalan, meaning that, like most
TV3 programs, they are solely meant for a Catalan audience. They are the bookends of a trilogy
which also includes a middle installment, El Laberint (2010), which “acknowledges the
complexities of Catalonia’s relationship with Spain” (Crameri 2014, 103) since the creation of
the autonomous region after the Transition to democracy. However, it seems to have been taken
down from the TV3 website and I have been unable to watch it. This is a shame, because while
both Adéu Espanya? and Hola, Europa! are essentially talking points on the reasons why
independence is not only feasible but almost inevitable, according to Crameri, El Laberint does
not project “an overriding assumption that independence is the best solution to [Catalonia’s]
problems” (103). Thus, it would have served as an interesting counterpoint to the sense of the
“inevitability” of independence, as it is presented in Adéu Espanya? and Hola, Europa! The third
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documentary from prior to the 2017 independence referendum is called Dissidents. El preu de la
discrepància a la Catalunya nacionalista (Dissidents: The Price of Dissent in Nationalistic
Catalonia, 2016). This was made by the organization Sociedad Civil Catalana, whose stated
mission is to defend pluralism and free political expression in Catalonia; however, in reality it is
common knowledge that it is an organization of citizens of Catalonia who are pro-Spain and
anti-Catalanist, and therefore against Catalan independence. This film was made a year and a
half before 1-O, when tensions were already high, and it discusses the perceived perils of not
being a Catalan nationalist in Catalonia.
Adéu Espanya?
Adéu Espanya? (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ky2mof8JDDc) (Genovès, Adéu
Espanya? 2010) borrows its title from an 1898 poem by Joan Maragall, a Catalan poet who was
part of the Renaixença, the Catalanist cultural movement that sought to equip the Catalan nation
with a literary corpus, particularly through the annual Jocs Florals poetry/prose competitions in
the late nineteenth century. The poem (Figure 2) is a plaintive cry mourning Spain’s
abandonment of the Catalans:
On ets, Espanya? No et veig enlloc.
No sents la meva veu atronadora?
No entens aquesta llengua que et parla entre perills?
Has desaprè d’entendre an els teus fills?
Adéu Espanya?
(Where are you Spain? I can’t see you anywhere.
Can’t you hear my voice resounding?
Don’t you understand the language that I speak amidst peril?
Have you forgotten how to understand your children?
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Goodbye Spain!)

Figure 2. Screenshot from Adéu Espanya? showing the poem by Joan Maragall with the
Barcelona airport in the background.

This poem was written in the midst of crises of the Spanish state, such as the final
crumbling of its empire with the loss of Cuba and the Philippines, and the Catalanists’ first
successful ventures into the public sphere. Maragall was questioning how exactly Catalonia fit
into Spain, casting it as an orphaned child abandoned by its parent. This sets the tone for a
documentary whose main purpose is to show how Catalonia is just another in a line of stateless
(or formerly stateless) nations, namely Greenland, Scotland, and Quebec, all of which have been
allowed by their states (or former states) to determine whether they remain part of that state or
gain independence from it. The film skips back and forth between these four nations, covering
issues like economics; population, geographic size, and number of inhabitants per square
kilometer; and history. Indeed, the documentary seems to be answering questions about the
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feasibility of Catalonia’s independence that it never actually asks, but which seem to serve as its
justification and main argument, namely:
Isn’t Catalonia too small (geographically and demographically) to be a state? (Answer:
no, it’s bigger, more populous, and/or more densely populated than its three
counterparts.)
Is there really a legal way for Catalonia to gain independence when this way is not
stipulated in the constitution? (Answer: Yes, no constitution – including those of
Denmark, Great Britain, and Canada – contains the mechanisms for part of a country’s
territory to secede, but, essentially, where there is a will there’s a way.)
What country would allow one part of it to secede? (Answer: Denmark, Great Britain,
and Canada have allowed the Greenlanders, Scots, and Quebecois to vote on secession,
even though only Greenland voted to become – and has become – independent from
Denmark.)
Does Catalonia have a strong enough economy to be independent? (Answer: Definitely!
It’s economy is not reliant on Spain.)

The film then discusses the history of all four nations, reaching far back into the past,
demonstrating Anderson’s contention that nations today are justified precisely by harking back to
their ancient past. When discussing this history, the filmmaker made the curious choice of using
Playmobil toys to reenact historical events (Figure 3). As Crameri says, “the idea of using toys
might give the impression of trivializing important events” (2014, 108), and it certainly seems
like a jarring choice that does nothing to support the seriousness of the film’s claims. However, it
may also be a decision to soften the earnest tone of its claims and make them more accessible –
and even fun and appealing – to a broader audience.
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Figure 3. Screenshot from Adéu Espanya? using Playmobil toys to explain the history of
Denmark and Greenland.

This ancient history then segues to a more recent explanation of the process leading up to
the independence referendums that they have all held except Catalonia, which Greenland carried
through with the cheery blessing of the Danes in 1979. In all three cases, the film shows
interviews with politicians from both the peripheral nation and the center, who in all cases agree:
1) if the nation wants independence, it will get it; 2) even if a mechanism for independence is not
contained in the country’s constitution or the EU regulations, it can be invented; the constitution
serves the people, not vice-versa. Although it is not overtly stated, the film’s implication is that
this is a normal process in normal countries with subnations within them, and therefore it should
be a normal, unquestioned possibility for Catalonia. Interestingly in retrospect, the film seems to
assert that the EU would support Scotland’s independence, as it did Greenland’s, the implication
being that it would support Catalonia’s as well. Furthermore, it notes that Scotland has its own
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mission to the EU (just as Quebec has a Ministry of International Relations), whereas it states
that Catalonia is not even allowed to have “official” international relations. However, after the
2017 referendum, the EU did not support Catalonia’s declaration of independence, most likely
because it was held without the permission of the EU member state, Spain.
It is interesting to take note of the arguments and discourses used. One recurring part of
the film is the use of a kinship model of nationality. As one speaker says, “it’s like a marriage. If
one member wants to leave it, it would be violent to force them to stay together.” This romantic
or primordialist model of Catalanism and its limited utility today will be discussed below, which
is why it is surprising to find it used as a supposedly valid argument for independence. One
prominent Catalan intellectual interviewed is Montserrat Guibernau, a professor of Political
Science at Queen Mary University of London, who has written extensively about the
“inevitability” of Catalonia’s eventual independence from Spain. She frames the problem
pragmatically, as “there’s no other way out” of the “democratic deficit” in Spain but
independence. She further claims that Catalans in favor of independence are “bona gent” (good
people) who are being “forced” into that option because of Spain’s refusal to engage in dialogue
over the issue, a curious claim that seems aimed at countering an unspoken contention that some
people view these Catalans as “bad people,” as indeed they have been portrayed in some Spanish
press.
Indeed, affect – whether with a kinship metaphor or otherwise – is constantly used to pull
at the Catalan audience’s heartstrings, not only through kinship metaphors and emotional
language but especially through images: the film is replete with majestic shots of iconic places in
Catalonia like Montserrat, the Pyrenees, and the Mediterranean, and Barcelona (Figure 4), as
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well as castellers or human tower builders, an iconic Catalan cultural phenomenon. After
building its arguments on why Catalonia should vote on independence as the natural next step,
and why this makes sense given what has happened in other stateless nations in Europe, the
documentary concludes with what could be considered a roadmap: a brief outline of the next
steps to be taken to reach this vote, seven years before it actually happened, although in reality a
different path led to its consummation.

Figure 4. Screenshot from Adéu Espanya? showing Montserrat mountain, a “place of
memory” of Catalonia (Balcells, 2008).

Hola, Europa!
El Laberint (the film that seems to have been taken down from the website) was released
just a few weeks after Adéu Espanya?, and three years later TV3’s program Sense Ficció aired
the third documentary in its series, optimistically entitled Hola, Europa!
(https://www.ccma.cat/tv3/alacarta/sense-ficcio/hola-europa/video/4562951/) (Genovès, Hola,
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Europa! 2013). Hola, Europa! starts with and repeatedly shows stunning shots of nature scenes
from all around Catalonia, along with the main cities which are the capitals of the four Catalan
provinces (Barcelona, Girona, Lleida, Tarragona) and shots of “regular folk,” all smiling into the
camera, many of them in uniforms denoting their working-class status (which contrasts starkly
with the well-dressed talking heads) (Figure 5), and some even in romantic old jobs which hardly
exist anymore yet hark back to a bucolic rural past, like shepherds. Interestingly, most of the
commentaries by the speakers do not show the person talking but instead focus on these shots of
common folk, cities, and beautiful scenery. As Crameri comments, “the shots of Catalonia’s
landscape, cities, and people… seem designed to prime the viewer to have positive feelings
towards the pro-independence arguments to follow” (2014, 110). Curiously, even though the
director is a woman, Dolors Genovès, only two of the 18 “experts” are women.

Figure 5. Screenshot from Hola, Europa! contrasting the “experts” and the “working folk.”

Fortunately, this film has no Playmobil animations as her previous film did, but it does use
an awkward device of monumental titles introducing each section, designed to look like they are
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carved in stone or another material associated with the background scene, emerging from the
landscape or descending from the sky to announce each new theme (Figure 6). Likewise, between
the main sections are shots of the four provincial capitals, thus covering the entire country, from
nature to each province, ensuring that all viewers (most likely residents of Catalonia, since again
this documentary is wholly in Catalan) find themselves represented in it.

Figure 6. Screenshot from Hola, Europa! showing the Foster Tower overlooking
Barcelona and the monumental title introducing the section justifying that Catalonia’s
telecommunications system could operate without Spain.

Just like Adéu Espanya?, this film also seems to be refuting implicit arguments as to why
Catalonia cannot be independent that are never actually uttered, but which the audience has
clearly heard many times. It begins with a voice intoning the names of all the presidents of
Catalonia, from the early twentieth century until today (with the natural gap of the Civil War and
the Franco dictatorship), and the claim that they have all tried to work with Spain, to find
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Catalonia’s “fit” (encaix) within Spain, leading to the main questions the documentary seeks to
answer: Has Catalanism failed? Or has the Spanish state failed? All the experts were “selected
for their authority to refute common anti-independence arguments” (Crameri 2014, 110).
Because this film takes a clear stance in favor of independence, these experts make some fairly
dramatic and unsubstantiated claims, such as that Spain is an industrialized country yet still
mired in the Ancien Régime in which the Catholic bishops still hold unofficial status as civil
authorities; that after the expulsion of the Jews, anti-Semitism was replaced with antiCatalanism; and that there is “grotesque asymmetry” in Spain because Spain asks Catalonia for
loyalty but shows it no loyalty in return. These arguments are clearly meant to appeal to viewers’
affect, in this case anger and outrage at being stuck in such a retrograde country. This is
reminiscent of Crameri’s discussion of the use of affect – negative affect in this case – as another
way of rallying nationalist sentiments; specifically, she discusses how the term espoli fiscal
(fiscal looting) is bandied about to rile people up and make them indignant at Spain’s supposed
misuse of the taxes it collects from Catalonia (Crameri 2014, 71). The different speakers also
repeatedly mention the fet diferencial, the vague but omnipresent phrase referring to what makes
Catalonia different from Spain, as a reality that justifies its independence.
Many of the speakers say that what Catalans want is the right to decide (el dret de
decidir) on their own future, and the documentary then goes on to discuss all the different
obstacles to Catalonia’s independence that have been suggested and refute them one by one. In
this sense, a great deal of the information found in Adéu Espanya? is repeated here, such as why
Catalonia is economically capable of being independent and how this could be legally possible.
It brings up the issue of Spanish people boycotting Catalan products – which has, indeed,
happened since 1-O – but counters this with the contention that recently the markets for Catalan
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products have shifted largely abroad, and the fact that any boycott would be mutual and therefore
bad for both countries. It also mentions anti-independence arguments like how multinationals
might leave Spain, the financial sector might suffer, the telecommunications and water supplies
might be jeopardized, and the cost might be too prohibitive, but then it shoots down all these
objections one by one.
Just like Adéu Espanya?, Hola, Europa! also provides a roadmap for independence, in
this case with a step-by-step guide. As it says, the movement should start from civil society (as it
did). The Parliament of Catalonia should then approve a consultation/referendum (which it did),
which “has to be recognized by other countries. If not, it won’t go very far” (it was not, and
neither did the independence declaration). A vote should then be held (it was), in which 50%
voter turnout would be acceptable (that was not reached) and 51% of the votes had to be in favor
of independence (of the low voter turnout, over 90% were in favor). Finally, the Parliament of
Catalonia should then unilaterally declare independence, and the rest of the world will decide
whether they accept it. In hindsight, this roadmap is interesting, and somewhat tragic in its naïve
optimism. It is almost like the experts were wishing away the existence of Spain and assuming
that countries around the world would ignore the wishes of their peer country, no matter how
retrograde, because it is an internal issue and Spain is a democracy. Furthermore, after the
declaration of independence, some multinationals (and Spanish companies) did leave Catalonia,
and the European Union did not support Catalonia in its declaration of independence. As Albert
Balcells (Balcells 2008) explains, “the Europe of the European Union is the Europe of and for
the states… It is not the Europe of the stateless nations, not even the Europe of the regions with
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legislative power [like Catalonia]”1 (10-11). Thus, not only was the European Union deaf to
Catalonia’s claims, ultimately, like the poem at the beginning of Adéu Espanya? bemoans,
Spain, in fact, was doing nothing to keep Catalonia; Spain “imposes itself, doesn’t reach
agreements;” and yet the community of nations and supranational entities like the EU supported
Spain, and Catalonia’s bid for independence was ultimately quashed.
Dissidents. El preu de la discrepància a la Catalunya nacionalista
Dissidents. El preu de la discrepància a la Catalunya nacionalista
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7_M2VuTprs8) (Jurado 2016) is a documentary that also
predates the referendum by a year but provides a clear sense of the opposition to the Catalan
independence movement within Catalonia, a group whose voices are admittedly silenced or
muted quite often. It is a series of interviews with experts and laypeople who live in Catalonia
but identify as Spanish or as Spanish speakers, or are against Catalan nationalism and feel
oppressed, marginalized, and/and discriminated against because of their stance. This
documentary is in both Catalan and Spanish and therefore is clearly targeted at a bilingual
audience in Catalonia.
Despite the ostensibly “neutral” mission of Sociedad Civil Catalana, the documentary
begins in high drama with a poem by W. H. Auden (translated into Catalan) shown in white
letters over a black background, in eerie silence. The poem is entitled “There Will Be No Peace,”
and it is worth repeating here:
You must live with your knowledge.

“L’Europa de la Unió Europea és la dels estats i per als estats... No és l’Europa de les nacions sense estat, ni tan
sols la de les regions amb poder legislatiu...”
1
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Way back, beyond, outside of you are others,
In moonless absences you never heard of,
Who have certainly heard of you,
Beings of unknown number and gender:
And they do not like you.
W. H. Auden, “There Will Be No Peace” (emphasis added)

This sets up the frightening scene of living in a place where you are disliked by unknown
Others, by that hostile “imagined community” to which you do not belong yet in whose midst
you dwell. The drama continues with people talking about the discrimination and recriminations
they have faced for opposing Catalonia’s independence or further encroachments of Catalanism,
especially linguistic matters in education and the media. They are in the shadows, as if their
identity is being protected to prevent retaliation (Figure 7). After this introduction, the spotlights
are theatrically turned on with dramatic sound effects to reveal their faces, implying their
courage at being willing to show their faces to that hostile “Other.” The background audio as this
happens is a fiery speech in Catalan by the former president of Catalonia, Jordi Pujol, speaking
to cheering throngs, a sound clearly meant to resemble a Hitler rally in the unsettling extremism
it seeks to evoke. The documentary then intersperses interviews with “everyday people,”
especially educators and journalists (employed by the Catalan government), as well as scholars
and politicians, to provide both subjective traumatic stories of the lived experiences of everyday
citizens and “objective” information by experts.
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Figure 7. Anonymous speaker at the beginning of Dissidents, in the shadows to
presumably protect her identity.

The film alleges that the Catalan education system and media have been co-opted by the
pro-independence gang, which has snuffed out any dissent through intimidation. The speakers’
incendiary accusations include that Catalanists are totalitarians; that the Catalan identity
proposed by the pro-independence movement is “exclusionary”; that the Catalan government has
forced thousands of Spanish-speaking teachers out so they don’t “contaminate” Catalan youths;
that the Catalans are rewriting history; that the Catalanists are using bots and fake ID’s on the
social media to intimidate and harass non-Catalanists in Catalonia; and that Catalanists accuse
non-Catalanists being pro-Franco, a galling accusation to most. Many of the speakers say that
while Catalans claim that their rights are being violated by Spain, the people whose rights are
actually being violated are non-nationalistic Spanish-speaking Catalans and residents of
Catalonia, who are citizens of Spain yet are not allowed to be Spanish. The documentary
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mentions a special report on Catalan journalists commissioned by the Catalan government which
rates their Catalan-language diction and political affinity, and the negative career consequences
and social media trolling of those who do not measure up. Likewise, the educators mention
dismissals if they disagree with Catalan-only education. In short, the Catalanists are depicted as
extreme, dangerous fanatics who zealously seek one goal and will raze anyone who disagrees
with them.
What is fascinating in this documentary is how the interviewees clearly support Spanish
nationalist claims while disputing the Catalans’ similar claims; they accuse their fellow Catalans
of precisely the same oppression that the Catalans accuse the Spaniards of. Given these
contradictory claims, it seems that nationalism, or whose nationalism, or what kind of
nationalism, is at the heart of this issue. This will be discussed in depth in section V.
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HEADING 4
SECOND SET OF DOCUMENTARIES: AFTER THE REFERENDUM
When I searched for documentaries about the referendum, I was trying to find several
perspectives: the Catalanist side, a neutral portrayal of the events and positions neutrally, and one
made from the Spanish vantage point. However, I was only able to find the first two since no
documentary about the referendum seems to have been made from the Spanish side. This in itself
is a telling “ghosting” of the event, or perhaps the non-event, in Spain which reflects the
televised remarks of the Deputy Prime Minister of Spain Soraya Sáenz de Santamaría on the day
of the referendum: “No ha habido referéndum” (“There has been no referendum”), and the Prime
Minister Mariano Rajoy: “Hoy no ha habido un referéndum de autodeterminación en Cataluña”
(“Today there has been no referendum on self-determination in Catalonia”), apparently a
coordinated strategy of the central government to undermine the legitimacy of the referendum by
erasure. Indeed, in a newspaper article about the making of Dos Cataluñas, when the directors
were asked if there was anyone who didn’t want to appear to share their opinion, they answered
that neither the Deputy Prime Minister nor the Prime Minister answered their requests for
interviews (Netflix estrenará el documental ‘Dos Cataluñas’ el próximo otoño 2018).
I watched a total of eleven documentaries on Catalonia’s independence referendum
ranging from 6 minutes to almost 2 hours, all available on YouTube or Netflix. To reasonably
tackle this project, I chose one film from the pro-Catalan and pro-independence point of view
and one with a more neutral portrayal of that day, although I mention one other as a minor source
of historical information on Spanish nationalism for comparative purposes. It is important to
note, however, that dividing Catalan and Spanish public opinion into three neat categories is a
vast oversimplification of the situation, as many people in both Catalonia and Spain have more
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nuanced opinions on the issue of Catalonia’s independence. Nonetheless, because the public
discourse tends to be very polarized, and because such nuances are beyond the scope of this
paper, I describe the documentaries as pro-independence or neutral. Below I provide a brief
synopsis of each video with my analysis of its ideology and the filmic techniques used to
enhance this vantage point.
Dos Cataluñas
Dos Cataluñas (Netflix España) (Álvaro Longoria and Gerardo Olivares 2019) is a
bilingual film which shows footage in both Spanish and Catalan and presents both sides of 1-O.
This feature-length documentary includes a mix of:
•

archival footage providing the background to the referendum;

•

footage of newscasts on election day and afterwards, featuring politicians and
journalists from both sides speaking both languages;

•

professional footage of the events on 1-O from the many journalists, both local
and international, whose cameras were set up in anticipation of drama after the
Guardia Civil were sent to Catalonia;

•

cellphone footage taken by Catalans showing the organization of the polling
stations, citizens voting (often jubilantly, taking smiling selfies with the people
around them cheering), then the Guardia Civil coming to the polling stations,
using violence to push through the crowds of Catalans protecting the ballot boxes,
and seizing and removing them, as well as many of moments of solidarity and
community, with chants of “Votarem” (We will vote) early in the day and “Hem
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votat” (We have voted) later, and small and large crowds breaking out in
renditions of Els Segadors;
•

interviews with Catalans who participated in the elections, Catalans who did not
and disagreed with it, and both Spanish and Catalan politicians; and

•

written captions throughout, narrating the events of the day and their aftermath in
chronological order.

The directors say they wanted the audience to reach their own conclusions (Netflix
estrenará el documental ‘Dos Cataluñas’ el próximo otoño n.d.) by showing just the facts, as
emphasized by a Daniel Patrick Moynihan quote shown in a caption at the beginning of the film:
“Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not to his own facts.” Despite this attempted
neutrality, I believe this documentary is slightly skewed to the Spanish side because it has more
Spanish than Catalan interviewees, and because the very title, indicating a fracture within
Catalan society, is an unproductive trope that doesn’t begin to explain the complex, muddy
reality. Then again, a Spaniard might say the same about the Catalan side, which may well be a
positive commentary on its neutrality and a reflection of my own allegiances. The filmmakers
say that they’re “both from Spain, though neither consider themselves Spanish” (Netflix
estrenará el documental ‘Dos Cataluñas’ el próximo otoño n.d.), a somewhat perplexing remark
given that emotions on this issue are high in both Spain and Catalonia. In short, the film can be
said to be an effective neutral-ish overview of the situation, a fast-paced and somewhat mindboggling onslaught of juxtaposed chronological images and footage from both sides.
The film opens with several scenes in different places at different times with masses of
pro-independence demonstrators as far as the eye can see singing the Catalan national anthem,
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Els Segadors, all spliced seamlessly together (Figure 8). It then follows with shots inside the
Parliament of Catalonia on the day that it approved the referendum, which juxtaposes the “two
Catalonias.” First, Catalan president Puigdemont says, “The fundamental guarantee which gives
sense to any system is that citizens may decide, and that decision is not a crime.” After that, it
cuts to Inés Arrimadas from the anti-independence Ciudadanos party saying that the referendum
was “…illegal, irregular, and what we have seen today is insane. With a majority of seats and a
minority of votes, you’re trampling on the rights of a majority of citizens represented by the
opposition.” As she is speaking, the camera cuts back to Puigdemont shaking his head in
disagreement or disbelief, and when Arrimadas finishes her speech, her entire party gets up and
leaves the parliamentary chamber to protest the illegal referendum by refusing to even honor it
with a vote. It then cuts to Rajoy, the prime minster of Spain, saying that the referendum is
“hurried, sloppy, and illegal, [and] will not be held,” a promise or a threat, depending on who is
receiving the message.

Figure 8. Image from the beginning of Dos Cataluñas with crowds of demonstrators
waving the pro-independence Catalan flag, the estelada.
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The next scene is the departure of some of the 10,000 Guardia Civil troops sent to
Catalonia to prevent the referendum; they are leaving a town in Spain with citizens lined up on
the sidewalks cheering them on and saying, “Go get them!” (the pro-independence Catalans).
Fast-forward to the day of the referendum, and the same guards dressed like stormtroopers from
Star Wars, except in black uniforms, every part of their bodies concealed and armored, pointing
machine guns and raising batons in a threatening manner towards the crowds of citizens in
Catalonia, who are nonetheless taunting them or refusing to move. At this point, mayhem breaks
out, with the guards beating the Catalan citizens with batons to get them out of the way and
shooting warning shots in the air so they could seize the illegal ballot boxes (Figure 9).

Figure 9. The Guardia Civil attempting to remove Catalan voters from the polling stations
on 1-O (https://theintercept.com/2017/10/01/spanish-police-beat-catalan-voters-deepeningdivide-threatens-spain/).
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And so the film goes on, contrasting one side with the other: footage of a Catalanist
politician followed by footage of a Spanish one, both sides claiming they are morally and legally
right, while the other side is not; shots of Catalans, post-vote, a collective mass emotionally
singing Els Segadors, hands extended overhead in triumph and power, juxtaposed with the
Spanish politicians claiming that absolutely nothing had happened that day (Figure 10). Just as in
Dissidents but in the opposite sense, the Catalans accuse Spain of being a dictatorship, while the
Spaniards discuss the “indoctrination” of Catalan youths into what one speaker called “Catalan
supremacy.” The film continues after the referendum, covering the “preventative” prison
sentences of the government leaders involved in it, and one commentator near the end of the film
concludes “how spectacularly unnecessary this whole mess is and how easily it could have been
avoided,” although it is unclear whether he is accusing one or both sides of this mulishness.

Figure 10. Catalan independence supporters triumphantly singing Els Segadors after the
results of the referendum were announced.
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La Gent de l’Escala
La Gent de l’Escala (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ONMZK0mMUy8) (Francesc
Escribano and Jordi Fusté 2018) was released one year after the referendum, almost to the day,
and is built around the scenes of violence captured by Catalans’ cellphone cameras at one
particular school that served as a polling place in a working-class neighborhood of Barcelona on
1-O. This particular footage appeared in every single video I watched as the most graphic
example of the gratuitous violence waged by the Spanish state against nonviolent Catalan
citizens. The documentary gets its title, which literally means “The People on the Staircase,”
from the fact that when the poll workers and voters at that school got word via social media that
the Guardia Civil were coming, they sat down, packed tight on the staircase just inside the school
door to act as a human shield to prevent the Guardia Civil from reaching the auditorium on the
floor above, where voting was taking place. The cameras of onlookers from the second floor
caught footage of the Guardia Civil kicking and pushing people off the staircase, and even
pulling one woman off by her hair (Figure 11). This documentary was made almost one year
later by one of the TV channels funded by the Catalan government; a journalist tracked down
those “people on the staircase” and interviewed them, juxtaposing their recollections with the
footage, and then their reactions to the footage one year after the fact, to chronologically narrate
the events of that day.
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Figure 11. Scene from La Gent de l’Escala, when the Guardia Civil are physically
removing the Catalans from the staircase.

This documentary in no way purports to be neutral. It is clearly pro-Catalan and antiGuardia Civil and Spanish government, and although it makes no explicit claims regarding
independence, the choice of topic and interviewees, coupled with the complete lack of
representation of the other side, mean that it is pro-independence, or at least pro-referendum,
pro-dret de decidir. The documentary uses many techniques to create Anderson’s “imagined
community” of Catalans pitted against the enemy: the Guardia Civil, representing the Spanish
state. One of the tactics it uses to build suspense, and almost fear (because all viewers know what
the outcome will be – the entire film is in Catalan and therefore geared to a Catalan audience), is
a series of maps with dots showing the locations of the Catalans and the Guardia Civil (Figure
12); what start as distant dots as the Guardia Civil disembark at the port gradually draw nearer to
the school, causing a looming dread in the viewer, which is no less and perhaps even heightened
because we are aware of what is coming, until the violence finally breaks out. Likewise, the
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interviews are often set to pensive, melancholy music which highlights the words of the
interviewees, many of whom were traumatized by the violence they experienced that day. As
each interviewee speaks emotionally, the footage is shown at the particular moment when they
were being roughed up or brutalized, their bodies circled in red onscreen so viewers can identify
them, almost a voyeuristic way to gain audience sympathy and spark outrage.

Figure 12. Maps with red dots showing the Catalan independence voters and blue dots
representing the Guardia Civil as they draw closer and try to find their way into the school.

This documentary also shows many scenes of community bonding, such as chants not
only of “Votarem” and “Hem votat,” but also of “Som gent de pau” (We are peaceful people),
clearly establishing Catalan identity in opposition to the violent Spaniards, represented by the
Guardia Civil. To me, the most striking part of this video is the fact that when asked, many of the
interviewees say that while they don’t regret voting, they’re not sure they would have
participated in 1-O if they had known the violent reaction of the Guardia Civil, evincing their
trauma. Yet somewhat contradictorily, when discussing the day there is a palpable sense of
nostalgia, of cherished communality, of having bonded with each other and truly brought that
community together. They mention the “caliu de la gent, el sentiment” (the warmth of people,
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the feeling), and the heroism of the community and political leaders who organized the
referendum, leading me to believe that in the long term, the Guardia Civil’s harsh reaction did
more to cohere Catalan society than a milder reaction would have.
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HEADING 5
NATIONALISM
In this section, to discuss and identify the main trends in these documentaries, I will
examine the notion of nationalism, particularly relying on Benedict Anderson’s definition and
description in Imagined Communities (1983), and then furthering that discussion with Michael
Billig’s concept of Banal Nationalism (1995) as a way to compare the “hot” nationalism in
Catalonia with the “banal” nationalism in Spain, and to trace them historically. I will also bring
in Kathryn Crameri’s take on banal nationalism in the article “Banal Catalanism?” (2000). I will
bring in Michel-Rolph Trouillot’s version of history in Silencing the Past (1995) and Albert
Balcell’s Llocs de Memòria dels Catalans for a brief discussion of different versions of history
depending on who writes it, attending power differentials and history as a non-objective account.
Regarding the evolution of Catalan nationalism, Kathryn Woolard’s book Singular and Plural:
Ideologies of Linguistic Authority in 21st Century Catalonia (2016) and Kathryn Crameri’s book
Goodbye, Spain? The Question of Independence for Catalonia (2014) offer insights into how the
very notion of Catalan nationalism has shifted over the years to accommodate changes in
Spanish society, in contrast to Josep Llobera’s view in The Foundation of National Identity:
From Catalonia to Europe (2004).
Benedict Anderson defines a nation as “an imagined political community [that is] both
inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson 1983). This provides one explanation of Catalans’
claims for sovereignty, a sovereignty they had in the distant past, lost in 1714 at the end of the
War of the Spanish Succession, and have continued to win back and lose to varying degrees
since then. Anderson evokes this imagined community via print capitalism with the image of
anonymous people who do not know and cannot see each other but are aware that they are all
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silently, solitarily, reading the same newspaper with the same news in the same language every
morning, binding them together in an invisible web of complicity. Thus, the imagined essence of
the community is that the members do not actually know everyone, but through shared actions
and experiences they imagine the community into existence. While the title of La Gent de
l’Escala literally means “The People on the Stairs,” it actually indirectly evokes this tight-knit
imagined community with a play on words: in ordinary parlance, la gent de l’escala is all the
people who live in your building, the people you greet in the elevator, borrow an egg from, and
go to homeowners’ meetings with, that is, not members of a nameless, faceless imagined
community but a true, daily, face-to-face community. The title of the documentary plus the
intimacy of the interviews in the film enhance the sense that these could be the folks who live in
my own building, ergo, they are my community, and I could have been in their shoes had I been
in the wrong place at the wrong time. As the speakers in that documentary say somewhat
wistfully, what they will always remember is the real sense of community they had on 1-O, the
sense that those folks they unconsciously rubbed shoulders with on staircases and in
supermarkets were now individuals with whom they felt strong bonds. Hence, the very heroism
and trauma of the event, in their eyes, helped render this imagined community real.
As mentioned above, one of the essential features of any nation is its claims of
ancientness, the fact that the nation “loom[s] out of an immemorial past” (Anderson 1983),
naturalizing its existence. Appadurai calls this the “paradox of constructed primordialism”
(Appadurai 1990) given that like most nations today, Catalonia did not exist 1000 years ago with
this name and self-awareness as a unique community. According to an expert interviewed in Dos
Cataluñas, Catalonia has wanted to politically detach itself from Spain eleven times in history.
The political nation that, according to Catalans, dates back almost 1,000 years first disappeared
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in 1714, but as a cultural and linguistic nation it has never disappeared. Lévi-Strauss says that
there is an exclusionary component of nationalism; that a nation is defined by what it is not, its
opposite or opponent, in this case Spain. In some ways Spain’s periodic repression of Catalonia
has probably done more to bind Catalans as an imagined national community than a more
laissez-faire policy would have. Indeed, a speaker in Dos Cataluñas says that since Rajoy had
come to power, there had been a huge rise in pro-independence sentiments in Catalonia, from
17% to 48%, precisely because of Rajoy’s unwillingness to make concessions. Yet according to
a speaker in Dissidents, Catalan politicians are the ones who wield the us-versus-them rhetoric to
“other” dissidents.
This brings up the issue of history: whose history gets told, and where? In Silencing the
Past: Power and the Production of History, Michel-Rolph Trouillot (Trouillot 2015) examines
history-making as an exercise of power. In this he concurs with Albert Balcells in Llocs de
Memòria dels Catalans (Balcells 2008), who says that “both memory and history are selective”
(11).2 Trouillot provides extensive evidence that the old adage that history is always written by
the winners is, in fact, true. And this becomes clear in the speakers from both sides in Dos
Cataluñas, and in the historical sketch of Catalonia in Adéu Espanya? Not surprisingly, the
history told by the Catalans to support their ancient past stands in stark contrast to the history
told by Spaniards. In another Spanish-language video I watched for background, Historia de la
nación y del nacionalismo español (History of the Nation and of Spanish Nationalism) (Andrés
de Blas and Jesús de Andrés 2014), Catalonia is simply not mentioned as a nation, and the
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“Tant la memòria com la història són selectives.”
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Spanish historians interviewed call Spain one of the oldest states in Europe, dating from the late
fifteenth century, clearly referring to the marriage of Isabella and Ferdinand. The Catalan version
of that history is that Ferdinand (Fernando in Spanish and Ferran in Catalan) was a Catalan who
may have married Isabella of Castile but sagely ensured that the Catalans were allowed to retain
their traditions, their legal organization, and their sovereignty. So, what the Catalans see as a
dynastic merger that left their nationhood intact, the Spaniards view as the dawn of Spain and the
erasure of Catalonia as a political nation. Balcells warns that, “we have to acknowledge that
inasmuch as history is interpretation, it would be hard for everyone to agree with the same
interpretation, no matter how contextualized and well-documented it is” (13).3 As Trouillot says,
“history is always produced in a specific historical context. Historical actors are also narrators,
and vice-versa” (22), demonstrating that both sides tell their versions of history, which are
“right” within the historical (and cultural) context in which they were written. This thus justifies
Spain’s claims that Catalonia’s independence would be a total anomalous breach in a centurieslong history, yet simultaneously and paradoxically the Catalans’ claims of independence as
simply the logical next step in its history, a return to sovereignty. We actually witnessed
Trouillot’s notion of silencing history in action on the day of the referendum by the
aforementioned comments of the Deputy Prime Minister and Prime Minister of Spain that
“There was no referendum,” thus ensuring that from the Spanish side, nothing happened that was
worth being recorded in the annals of history, whereas from the Catalanist side 1-O was a

“Cal reconèixer que a la mesura que la història és interpretació, difícilment tothom estarà d’acord amb la mateixa
interpretació, per més contextualitzada i documenta que estigui.”
3
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momentous day when the Catalans finally spoke out to overcome their entrapment within an
oppressive state.
Regarding Spain today, the same Spanish historians in Historia de la nación y del
nacionalismo español discuss Spanish nationalism as pluralistic, a nationalism in which many
different identities and ideological stances can fit. This claim is clearly disputed by proindependence Catalans, who believe their rights are being trampled on. The Catalans openly
acknowledge that they are nationalists, while the Spaniards believe their stance simply reflects
reality, a given, an example of Michael’s Billig’s “banal” nationalism, as I shall discuss below.
Yet as Pablo Iglesias, the head of the left-wing populist party Podemos says in Dos Cataluñas,
there are different kinds of nationalisms: the chauvinistic reactionary type, and the international,
socially conscious type. Clearly to him, Catalan nationalism is the latter while its Spanish
counterpart is the former. Yet that is countered by the speakers in Dissidents, who claim that
their rights are being trampled on by the narrow chauvinism of the Catalanists, as proven by the
fact that they are unable to freely express their dissent. In fact, one speaker in Dissidents claimed
that the Catalans are reinventing history and the past, the product of a toxic Catalan nationalism
that is impoverishing the culture by refusing to allow anything Spanish; he then asks the
rhetorical questions, “Who is violent? Who is totalitarian?” His answers are clearly the Catalans.
Finally, the speakers in Historia de la nación y del nacionalismo español also contrasted Spanish
nationalism during the Franco dictatorship, which was fascist and militaristic, with Spanish
nationalism today, in which Spain is divided into autonomous communities that “give peripheral
nationalisms some self-determination” (I can only imagine the Catalans’ reactions to being called
a “peripheral nationalism”), which in his mind is sufficient, so why are the Catalans
complaining? In short, I believe that one speaker in Dos Cataluñas summed it up the best by
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saying that “The nationalist always thinks the other is a nationalist, that he’s not a nationalist.”
This confirms Trouillot’s contention that aspects of history and culture are cherry-picked to
support one’s own nationalism as natural, versus the other’s, which is constructed and therefore
false. As Appadurai says, “one man’s imagined community is another man’s political prison”
(Appadurai 1990), precisely the Catalanists’ feelings as they sought to throw off the Spanish
shackles once and for all on 1-O.
So, whose nationalism is “right”? Will the real nationalists please stand up? And is
nationalism in any form acceptable? In Banal Nationalism (1995), Michael Billig makes the case
for “hot” versus “banal” nationalism. The term “nationalism” is often used pejoratively (as it is
in Dos Cataluñas and Dissidents), to refer to fanatics seeking to rend the order of a country
asunder. This is Billig’s “hot” nationalism. However, he argues that nationalism is built into our
very identities, associated with our nations, the organizing unit of the international order today.
Just like Anderson, Billig also asserts that this seemingly “natural” division of the world into
nations is neither natural nor eternal but a creation of the past several hundred years. Crameri
(200) describes banal nationalism as being “squarely based on an accepted rhetoric which takes
the nation as a given and the allegiance of all citizens for granted” (146), the perfect description
of the Spaniards, as mentioned in the previous paragraph. In solid nation-states, banal
nationalism includes flags flying in front of banks, post offices, or gas stations; the deixis
regularly used to talk about “us” and “them,” which goes virtually unnoticed; and the language
and content of newspapers, which talk first and foremost about “our” country (think of the
Olympics). He claims that this nationalism is so everyday, so banal, that it ceases to be visible,
and we are unaware of its power to influence the way we see the world. Thus, when the
Spaniards in films such as Dissidents disparagingly discuss Catalan nationalism because, after
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all, Catalans are a part of Spain, they do not seem to realize that both Catalonia and Spain are
constructed nations with their own nationalisms, but that this nationalism is banal in Spain
because as an actual nation-state, it has no need to exhibit a “hot” nationalism.
Interestingly, at the time Crameri wrote her article “Banal Catalanism?” in 2000,
Catalonia itself had fully plunged into banal nationalism with the concessions it had won from
the Spanish government in areas such as culture and education after the Transition from the
dictatorship to democracy in its first Statute of Autonomy. She says that while some more
fervent nationalists were dismayed at the apparent cansament (weariness, fatigue) with “hot”
nationalism, it came about because “in granting the statute of autonomy the Spanish state was not
merely being seen to be supportive of Catalan culture in some abstractly beneficent fashion but
in fact was giving substantial autonomy in cultural matters and handing over political powers in
areas which are not purely cultural and which, in more centralized Western countries, are
normally retained by the state” (Crameri 2000, 147). As a result, symbols of Catalan nationalism
like the flag, hung alongside the Spanish flag, no longer packed the powerful punch they did in
the dictatorship. In short, with the concessions granted, Catalans fell into the sort of complacency
or nationalistic torpor that is the breeding ground for cool or banal nationalism. However, writing
in 2000, she noted that all it would take to revive the latent “hot” nationalism was for the Spanish
government to start retracting these concessions, as indeed it did in 2006. As she says in her
conclusion, “Of course, nothing said here denies the potential of ‘banal’ nationalisms to become
‘hot’ again if circumstances permit or require this” (155), a prescient description of precisely
what happened, leading to the situation today.
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Crameri wrote Goodbye, Spain? in 2014, shortly after the first two documentaries, Adéu
Espanya? and Hola, Europa!, were made. She makes interesting arguments for what Catalanism
actually is today, and why those documentaries overtly evoke rational arguments while only
covertly or subtly citing identitarian or sentimental arguments. In this she echoes Kathryn
Woolard’s distinction between authenticity and anonymity in her study of shifting attitudes
towards the Catalan and Spanish languages in Catalonia, Singular and Plural: Ideologies of
Linguistic Authority in 21st Century Catalonia (2016). During the dictatorship, the Catalan
language (and, we can add, culture) had become regionalized, viewed as a “territorially rooted
linguistic identity framed as authentic and natural to Catalonia” (Woolard 2016: 40), as the
standard language ideology deemed that Spanish was the natural, banal national language. As
Crameri (2000: 153-4) put it, during this period, Catalan language and culture were viewed “as
some kind of quasi-mystical force which expresses the Catalan soul and its unique relationship
with its territory”. Thus, Catalan language and culture were related to what Woolard calls
“authenticity,” or particularism, an essential, primordial part of the Catalan identity and therefore
not for outsiders (2016: 24). At that time, Catalan was often referred to as the llengua pròpia of
Catalonia and the Catalans, that is, their own language, an inherent, inalienable part of the
Catalan identity, which needed to be reasserted under the restored freedom, just as Catalan
culture expressed the fet diferencial, or what makes Catalonia unique, especially from Spain,
which also arose repeatedly in Adéu Espanya? This was no doubt due to the threat from the
Spanish state: it was essential to protect what was unique about Catalonia’s language and culture
while it was menaced by the behemoth of Spanish.
However, as Catalonia emerged from the dictatorship, during which millions of
Spaniards had “immigrated” to Catalonia, the original strategy of appealing to the authenticity of
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Catalan language and culture, making them something that was explicitly not accessible to
outsiders, became a constraint. Therefore, the challenge after autonomy was to transform the
Catalan language from a “private marker of authentic ethnolinguistic identity to a more
anonymous, universally available public language” (Woolard, 2016:10) and to spread Catalan
culture to anyone living in Catalonia: the paradigm shift from authenticity to anonymity. Crameri
draws an interesting parallel between the use of the Catalan language and its flag, the senyera.
Whereas during the dictatorship, the senyera was illegal and dangerous, a sign of “hot”
nationalism, during the transition it became a “joyous rallying point for those who had waited so
long to be able to display it proudly” (2000: 148), merely another banal symbol. Likewise,
during the dictatorship Catalan had to remain a private, hidden language, whereas upon
autonomy it was held up as the shining symbol of Catalan identity. Yet as the years wore on, just
as the senyera became banal as it was flown everywhere, often alongside the Spanish flag, so
Catalan language and culture became banal, as the former was spoken everywhere and by most
everyone: a shift from purism to cosmopolitanism. Once this balance was upset after 2006, the
senyera once again became a potent symbol. In fact, a pro-independence version of it, called the
estelada (based on estel, the star that was added), can be seen on balconies, streets, polling
centers, and people’s clothing and accessories in Dos Cataluñas and La Gent de l’Escala (Figure
13). Interestingly, as nationalism in Catalonia was “heating up,” in 2016 the Spanish government
forbade Catalans from carrying the estelada to a football match, alleging that it is a symbol that
may “incite, foment or help violent or terrorist behavior”4 (Duran 2016).

4

“inciten, fomenten o ayuden a la realización de comportamientos violentos o terroristas”
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Figure 13. The traditional Catalan flag, the senyera, on the left, and the pro-independence
version, the estelada, on the right.

In line with Woolard’s arguments, Crameri contrasts previous rationales for
independence based on ethnicity/identity (the primordialist argument) with more modern ones
based solely on economic pragmatism, as clearly evinced in Adéu Espanya? and Hola, Europa!.
Catalan identity became available to anyone who “felt” or “wanted to be” Catalan
(instrumentalism), thus expanding the pool of possible Catalans. As one Catalanist politician
succinctly put it, Catalanism now “comes from the head and the pocket, rather than the heart”
(Crameri 2014, 55). She interestingly notes that Catalan ethnicity is considered “thin,” in the
sense that it “organizes relatively little of social life in action… especially now that Catalonia is
so ethnically diverse” (11), a contention that contrasts starkly with Llobera in Foundations of
National Identity: From Catalonia to Europe, who believes Catalan ethnic identity to be a
driving force in the country. As Llobera contends: “I would say that the spirit of the nation is
what gives people their sense of being, their authenticity; it is changeable, but it also shows
continuity” (Llobera 2004, 5). He equates nationalism with a kind of kinship writ large and cites
Geertz’s primordialism: group identity is a priori, ineffable, yet coercive, and affective, and this
naturally leads to national sentiments. Thus, Llobera’s view of nationalism is clearly the
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affective, heartfelt legacy of the Romantic tradition: “The concept of love of country draws its
strength, its character and its imagery from the familial and religious spheres. Love of country is
extremely possessive and requires absolute loyalty” (31). He even extends the kinship metaphor
so far as to say that “when reference is made to Catalonia in Spain, the point is made that you
cannot have two mothers; you are born only in one country that is your true mother” (55), a
clearly affective appeal for the naturalness and inevitability of Catalan nationalism. As
mentioned above, this kinship metaphor also appears in Adéu Espanya? with the speaker who
compares the bond between Catalonia and Spain to a marriage: “If one member wants to leave it,
it would be violent to force them to stay together.” Yet in addition to the fact that more
pragmatic than emotional arguments are used today, Crameri also points out that positive and
negative affect cut both ways: each nationalism describes itself positively and the other
negatively: “Are Catalans industrious and entrepreneurial or moneygrubbing? Is Catalan
nationalism inclusive and civic or exclusive and ethnic? Is the Catalan language a way to
integrate into Catalan society or an enforced social, political, and economic barrier?” (71).
Indeed, while pulling the positive affective heartstrings of the Catalans, Llobera turns this
on its head when alleging the reasons Catalonia must detach itself from Spain: “the Catalan case
shows that while history was written by the winners, that is, a crypto-fascist Spanish nationalCatholicism bent on eradicating Catalan separatism, the losers manage to preserve their ethnic
national identity” (118, emphasis added). This not only echoes the emotionally loaded language
of one speaker in Hola Europa!, who cited the “grotesque asymmetry” between Spain and
Catalonia, but it also concurs with Trouillot’s contention of how history is written, in this case
from the Catalanist viewpoint, while clearly appealing to emotions instead of the “rational”
arguments that predominate today. Nadia Lovell (Lovell 1998) mentions that “notions and
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feelings of collective belonging are mobilized at particular times, and on the instrumentality of
such feelings and making explicit particular aspects of collective identities and claims on
territory” (5), thus connecting emotions and territory. Crameri cites debates which now consider
territory more important as a basis for political legitimacy (i.e., independence or sovereignty)
than ethnicity or kinship; that is, territory is a “post-ethnic substitute” (Crameri 2014, 11). As
proof of this, she noted how Catalanism waned considerably between the first post-dictatorship
Statue of Autonomy in 1978 and the proposed newer one, and how the keen sense of Catalanism
and pro-independence today truly emerged with force after the Constitutional Court rejected
Catalonia’s expanded authorities on many matters (education, media, language policy). In the
revision of the statue of autonomy in 2004 to 2006, the Spaniards only allowed it to say that
Catalans viewed themselves as a nation as opposed to that Catalonia is a nation, sparking the
conflict. Nonetheless, the switch from Catalanism as ethnicity to Catalanism as mere location,
and the use of pragmatic arguments like economics as opposed to identity, have led Spanish
nationalists to “seize on the discordant notes in this narrative as proof of the illegitimacy of the
whole Catalanist project” (Crameri 2014, 38). Yet the importance of affective ties is clear in the
nostalgic sense of community togetherness forged on 1-O that the interviewees in La Gent de
l’Escala repeatedly mention, while the power of the primordialist and kinship emotional appeals
ring through the scenes of “regular folk” and beloved landscapes, the wellspring of the Catalans,
in Adéu Espanya? and Hola, Europa!
Getting back to Adéu Espanya? and Hola, Europa!, Crameri says that recent pragmatic
political discourse seeks to make Catalans aware of their alternatives; that is, that there has been
a shift in Spain’s policies, with no apparent (satisfactory) solution, and therefore independence is
one solution. She shows how “between 2000 and 2013, a series of simplified messages about
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independence has been generated, transmitted, and widely accepted… even in some cases by
Catalans who did not support independence,” an echo of the pragmatic (i.e., economic) motives
cited in these two documentaries. Interestingly, for this very reason, that is, to enlist the support
of people who are unsure about or against independence, the issue has been reframed as the
“right to decide” (dret de decidir) as opposed to the right to independence. A notable Catalan
historian has described the phrase “right to decide” as “a comfortable refuge so as not to have to
call things by their name” (Crameri, Goodbye, Spain? The question of independence for
Catalonia 2014). Yet indeed the “right to decide” is now the hegemonic discourse that has
usurped identity or language, and it figures prominently in Adéu Espanya? and Hola, Europa! as
the argument in favor of the referendum, especially the former: Scotland, Greenland, and
Montreal have been allowed to decide on their political futures; why can’t Catalonia?
With regard to the “simplified messages” about independence cited above, which are
clearly evinced in Adéu Espanya? and Hola, Europa!, Crameri says that “behind this process lies
a stress on the rationality of the idea of secession, distancing the pro-independence movement
from sentimental or identitarian arguments, which are often instead attributed to the antiindependence constituency” (54), again highlighting the shift from authenticity to anonymity,
purism to cosmopolitanism. However, the problem with underscoring the rationality of the
arguments is that “the doxa of rationality and democracy allows those who argue against these
statements to be easily dismissed as irrational and undemocratic, without needing to engage in
detail with their arguments” (70). As Puigdemont says at the beginning of Dos Cataluñas, “The
fundamental guarantee which gives sense to any system is that citizens may decide, and that
decision is not a crime.” Thus, any Spaniard who debates the rationality of that argument must,
in Catalanists’ view, be irrational and undemocratic. Indeed, despite the fact that this book was
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written seven years ago, this perfectly captures the tensions in Spain today: both sides are so
convinced of the rightness and rationality of their arguments, as seen in the speakers on either
side in Dos Cataluñas and Dissidents, that they disdainfully dismiss the other side, hindering any
progress on the matter, which is clearly real and will not simply vanish.
Anderson discusses the importance of language in creating the imagined national
community, especially poetry and song, and in particular the national anthem. As he says, “No
matter how banal the words and mediocre the tunes, there is in this singing an experience of
simultaneity. At precisely such moments, people wholly unknown to each other utter the same
verses to the same melody. The image: unisonance” (Anderson 1983). Therefore, anthems
become another way of creating the imagined community. What is captured in all the cellphone
footage of 1-O in Dos Cataluñas and La Gent de l’Escala, without fail, is not only violence but
also community solidarity, especially groups of Catalans at the polling stations or on the streets
singing Els Segadors. They may be doing this in a circle at the polling station, holding hands as
the Guardia Civil seizes the ballot boxes, or jubilantly at a polling station the Guardia Civil
didn’t reach, where the votes were able to be cast and counted. At the end of Dos Cataluñas, the
footage jumps from site to site as the overwhelmingly positive results of the vote are announced.
One scene that is repeated in different locations is a community organizer standing on a balcony,
overlooking throngs of Catalans anxiously awaiting the results. When they are announced
(usually over 90% in favor of independence), the audience on the streets claps wildly and then
euphorically breaks into Els Segadors, often in an almost trance-like state, arms waving in the air
and the crowd swaying in unison.
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When discussing the emergence of nationalism, Anderson claims that in some respects it
replaced religion as what people believe in, as the community for which we are even willing to
die. And religion requires rituals and rites of passage. At several points, the events of 1-O evoked
not only ritual and rites of passage but also even trance-like states, revealing this connection
between nationalism and secular religiosity.
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HEADING 6
RITUAL AS NATION-BUILDING
The first scenes that evoke a kind of heroic deed, shown in both Dos Cataluñas and La
Gent de l’Escala, is citizens bringing the ballot boxes to the polling stations. Both films show
dark, quiet streets in a usually busy city at around 5 a.m., the stillness giving a sense of suspense
and foreboding of what is going to happen. A person is filmed at home, clearly a small, modest
home, getting out of bed, brushing their teeth, getting dressed, and pulling a plastic bin wrapped
in a black garbage bag, the ballot box, out from their closet or under their bed. Then they sleepily
make their way by car to the polling stations as the dawn begins to lighten the sky. There, despite
the early hour, they are greeted with a gauntlet of fellow Catalans, who likely spent the night
there to keep the Guardia Civil out, cheering as the person makes a mad dash with the ballot box
from their car into the polling place, like heroic yet beleaguered Olympic torchbearers being
cheered as they enter the stadium. In fact, Barcelona hosted the Olympics in 1992, and this was a
seminal moment when the city and Catalonia as a whole regained their national pride after the
oppression of the dictatorship and announced their existence to the world. It put Barcelona on the
global map, and its opening and closing ceremonies were quite pointedly in Catalan, not Spanish.
Therefore, it is not surprising that this nation-building event is echoed in the latter-day “heroes”
running with ballot boxes, not torches, into the polling places, lest the Guardia Civil come and
seize them, getting a hero’s welcome as they risk their lives for their nation.
The entire series of events on 1-O almost perfectly fit Victor Turner’s structure of rites of
passage, which he claims takes the participants from one social state to another with the goal of
effecting social change (Turner 1969). While Turner discusses rites of passage in terms of
individuals, in this case the “individual” is writ large, to the body politic of Catalonia, part of
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which bound together as a single entity during this crucial rite of passage. Turner breaks rituals
down into the previous structure, then the liminal stage, which is when communitas or antistructure is created, and finally reincorporation. The first phase symbolizes “the detachment of
the individual or group either from an earlier fixed point in the social structure, from a set of
social conditions (“a state”) or from both” (Turner 1969, 94). During the liminal stage “the
characteristics of the ritual subject… are ambiguous; he [sic] passes through a cultural realm that
has few or none of the attributes of the past or coming state” (94). This liminality is necessarily
ambiguous: “liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the
positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial” (95). The third
phrase is reeducation or reincorporation, in which the passage to the new state is consummated.
Connecting this with 1-O, the initial structure is clearly the previous state of Catalonia,
(willingly) part of Spain, or perhaps without yet feeling the urgency to confront the issue of
independence openly. In the second stage, liminality or anti-structure, an alternative social reality
can be invented, and society can be reimagined. In Catalonia, this came to a head on 1-O, the day
of the referendum, when the Catalan people (who voted) were in an ambiguous middle state,
neither (in their minds) part of Spain yet not sure of the outcome, which if positive would make a
declaration of independence possible. However, this liminal state actually began earlier, when
the Parliament of Catalonia declared that it was going to hold the referendum, despite the fact
that the Spanish government had declared it illegal. From that moment on, Catalonia was
suspended in this state of liminality, “betwixt and between,” neither (willingly) part of Spain nor
yet its own independent country. And this is precisely when the community began to bond
around the logistics of the elections: sites, ballots, personnel.
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This liminality is echoed, too, in the insecurity yet excitement at the beginning of the day
on 1-O, the sense at dawn that something big was looming ahead, as shown in both La Gent de
l’Escala and Dos Cataluñas. Turner also mentions the communitas that develops among the
people experiencing liminality together, forging an unbreakable bond. On 1-O, this liminality
would entail the uncertainty of voting, the ritual of counting the votes, the crowds waiting around
to hear the results and then coming together, swaying, some crying, some laughing and
whooping, all singing Els Segadors in unison, a moment when they are “born” anew as Catalan
citizens. As Turner says of this stage, “among themselves, neophytes [the Catalans, in this case]
tend to develop an intense comradeship and egalitarianism. Secular distinctions of rank and
status disappear or are homogenized” (95). This is readily visible in the videos, and the
participants in La Gent de l’Escala also mention that sense of community as one of the best
things about that day. The communitas that is formed within this liminal stage “emerges where
social structure is not” (126), in that “betwixt and between” state, as were the Catalans on 1-O,
after deliberately rejecting the structure of the Spanish state to plunge into this limbo, not
knowing how or where they would emerge on the other side. This reflects the potentiality of
ritual, the question of its outcome; as Turner says, “communitas also has an aspect of
potentiality; it is often in the subjunctive mood” (127), meaning that the “what if” is greater than
any certainty, as was clearly the case on 1-O.
Turner discusses the liminal nature of movements that “arise in times of radical social
transition, when society itself seems to be moving from one fixed state to the other” (133), an apt
description of Catalonia from 2006 until its bid for independence on October 1, 2017. Catalan
culture is fairly class- and image-driven, but this idea of communitas, when classes disappear and
people merge into an amorphous whole, came to the fore on the day of the referendum, when
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neighbors who barely knew each other fused into a collective body, as recounted in La Gent de
l’Escala. As Turner says, “spontaneous communitas has something ‘magical’ about it.
Subjectively there is in it the feeling of endless power” (139), and the heroic depiction of the
participants in the 1-O polling places certain confirms this magical view of their (super)powers
that day, while the triumphant renditions of Els Segadors, the crowds swaying in unison, was the
ultimate expression of the feeling of endless power, anticipating (though erroneously) their soonto-be triumph as an independent nation.
The last phase in Turner’s analysis of ritual is reaggregation or reincorporation, where the
participants are reintroduced into society with a new social status. This is the tricky part of
analyzing 1-O through Turner’s ritual lens. In Turner’s view, the person who reincorporates into
the structure is changed, has a different status. However, because independence was ultimately
shot down by the Spanish state and the referendum leaders (both civil and political) were
punished with imprisonment and fines (or escaped them via exile), 1-O could conceivably be
viewed as a thwarted ritual because that reincorporation with a different status (independent
statehood) was not ultimately achieved. However, my impression is that the participants in 1-O
would disagree with this, in that their standing up to Spain and declaring their intentions gives
them—among themselves—a new status, a new pride, a buoyed sense of courage. In fact, two
speakers in Dos Cataluñas recount one of the Catalans’ victories on 1-O, even if they did not
achieve independence. Pablo Simón, a political scientist, describes this victory as follows:
What proves that the [Spanish] government never imagined the impact of all this is that
the government representative ordered the police to stop intervening mid-morning. And
therefore they understood that their actions had been very questionable and that they
hadn’t got the results they were hoping for. [emphasis added]
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This quote is illustrated with images of Catalans chasing the Guardia Civil as they retreat,
perhaps unaware of the government order and feeling that they are using their power to force
them out, chanting “fora” (get out) and “assesins” (murderers).5 As Simón goes on to say,
“There is no way you can spin, inside or outside of Spain, baton charges against people who are
voting. There is no discourse, no way to tell it in a credible way.” Likewise, Ignacio Escolar,
founder of eldiario.es (online newspaper), also discusses the Catalans’ “victory” in exposing the
Spanish state for what it is: a relic of its dictatorial past:

People voting, a lot of elderly people, children, and guys dressed like Darth Vader with
their batons, pushing and so on. It was a complete disaster. Especially because for the
[Spanish] government, it was a disastrous day because they weren’t able to avoid the two
photos they wanted to avoid: the one of people [Catalans] voting normally, which
happened and there were people who voted, and the one of the police restraining the
voters, which also happened.

This sense of a new status, a new pride at standing up to the oppressor, is particularly
salient at the end of La Gent de l’Escala, as the interviewees discussed what happened next: they
went home with a renewed sense of community, now actually knowing la gent de l’escala, the
imagined community now a real community with names and faces. In Dos Cataluñas this is
shown by the events that transpired after 1-O, as the Catalan government actually declared

5

In fact, no lives were lost on 1-O.
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independence, a move that forced many members into exile and sent some to jail. Even though
the referendum did not achieve its goal of independence for Catalonia, if we recall that Anderson
considers nationalism essentially cultural, not political, then it did achieve its goal: Catalans
successfully bound together to defy their oppressor. David faced Goliath, and the Catalans who
participated in the pro-independence movement reached a new state of collective being with a
new sense of meaning and purpose and a new religion: the religion of a free and independent
Catalonia.
Interestingly, writing four years after the referendum, with all the lawsuits, exiles, prison
sentences, and social upheaval resulting from 1-O in the interim, things have calmed down and
the issue of independence is not as “hot” as it was in 2017. Turner does state that the
“spontaneity and immediacy of communitas – as opposed to the general political structure – can
seldom be maintained for very long” (132), and that all communitas starts in spontaneity and
eventually “declines and falls” into structure and law (132). In the case of Catalonia, it’s a
symptom of the gradual downshift from “hot” to “banal” nationalism. Indeed, this denouement
also supports my contention that while what occurred on 1-O was perhaps not a classic example
of Turner’s ritual, it certainly has the initial structure, liminality, and communitas, and even the
reaggregation or reincorporation in the sense that the Catalans spoke out, and were heard, even
though their desires were not honored and the declaration came at a steep political cost for its
civil and political leaders.
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HEADING 7
CONCLUSION
The battle between Spanish and Catalan nationalism is a clear instance of a trend that
Anderson identified in recent history: nationalisms being challenged by sub-nationalisms that
“dream of shedding their sub-ness one day” (Anderson 1983). In Catalonia, sub-ness was never
accepted (just as it would never define itself as a “peripheral nationalism”) and has long been
contested. Indeed, gaining independence from Spain, the usurper of its rights, is a longstanding
effort that has been “hotter” or more “banal” depending on the political juncture. As Appadurai
says, “for polities of smaller scale, there is always fear of absorption by polities of larger scale,
especially those that are nearby” (Appadurai 1990). Catalanists are happy to be European
citizens but have been threatened by being permanently engulfed by Spain for more than three
centuries.
The issue of Catalan nationalism inevitably brings up questions of the other subnationalisms within Spain today in Valencia, Galicia, and most notably the Basque Country.
While neither Valencia nor Galicia have strong movements that “dream of shedding their subness,” in recent history Basque nationalism in Spain (just like Catalonia, the Basque-speaking
land spans Spain and France) has been as strong if not stronger than Catalan nationalism yet took
a different path at a different time. Basque nationalism also emerged in the late nineteenth
century, when its local laws (fueros) were abolished, “but replaced… with a special regime of
autonomous taxation - the concierto económico - for Navarre and the three Basque provinces”
(Payne 1971), leading to fiscal advantages which tempered any resentment; in contrast, when
Catalonia’s laws had been abolished a century and a half earlier, no compensation was provided
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and the resentment lingered, especially after Catalonia became one of Spain’s economic
powerhouses in the Industrial Revolution.
Just like the Catalans, the Basques were on the losing side of the Spanish Civil War, and
the Basque language and culture were banned during the Franco dictatorship, although by then,
unlike Catalan, Basque was no longer spoken by many Basques, and there was not a strong
Basque literary tradition. After the death of Franco, the Basque bid for independence was
channeled through ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna or Basque Homeland and Liberty), a terrorist
organization that caused death and destruction throughout Spain, prompting a widespread
rejection not only in Spain in general but also in the Basque Country. ETA only ended its actions
in 2011, when it was allowed to become a political party. Therefore, “while the Basque case has
been, for many years, a history of violence, the Catalan case has been overwhelmingly peaceful”
(Errasti-Lopez 2019). Interestingly, this was right about when Catalan “banal” nationalism
started to heat up and turn towards independence. Part of Catalonia’s claims were precisely that
just as the Basque Country was gaining further powers of home rule, the Spanish government
was trying to strip Catalonia of the authorities it had been transferred in its rejection of the
proposed 2006 Catalan Statute.
So why was the Basque Country given more authorities while the Catalans were being
stripped of them? Perhaps it may have to do with the fact that the Basques have always been
viewed as the “local aliens” in Spain, given the fact that their language is not Indo-European and
they are considered the remnants of an ancient people. As Payne summarizes, “the origins of the
Basques remain shrouded in mystery. They are evidently descendants of one of the primal
population groups of the peninsula that largely resisted Romanization” (Payne 1971). In contrast,

56

the Catalans are considered the recalcitrant siblings, fully incorporated into the Iberian, Roman,
and Bourbon worlds of Spain since they emerged as a nation and therefore expected to act
accordingly. Likewise, after an aborted attempt at a reform of the statute of autonomy and a
referendum on self-determination in the Basque Country from 2001-2005, “the majority of
Basque political representatives are endorsing a reform strategy while the majority of Catalan
representatives have been supporting a break-up strategy” (Errasti-Lopez 2019). That is, instead
of backing down and trying to find the path of compromise the Catalans are still trying to get
more home rule, and indeed as seen in Adéu Espanya? and Hola, Europa!, may claim that they
have sought a dialogue with Spain, to no avail. Finally, while the Basques blame their failure to
gain independence on internal reasons, Catalonia still blames Spain. Indeed, “as a result of this
failed attempt of reforming the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, the majority of Catalan citizens
claimed, both through demonstrations and at the ballot box, that they wanted the freedom to
decide on their relationship with the Spanish State [the dret de decidir]. In the Basque case, the
possibility of reform is still a potential path to explore” (Errasti-Lopez 2019). Therefore, the
issue of Basque independence is tabled for the time being, while for many Catalans it is still an
active desire.
The ground for this desire was laid and fertilized by the rhetoric visible in first two
videos, Adéu Espanya? and Hola, Europa!, which sought to “prove” that not only was Catalonia
part of a community of nations-within-nations that have the right to decide on their own political
future, but its independence is feasible politically, economically, culturally, and
demographically. Yet they further appeal to Catalans’ sense of rootedness in their geography and
history to pull at their heartstrings and evoke affect as a way of defending its independence.

57

Indeed, everything goes back to Anderson’s imagined community seeking its own
sovereignty. Yet who deserves sovereignty? Who constitutes a nation? The contested nature of
competing nationalities is illustrated when comparing the claims aired in Dissidents with those in
Adéu Espanya?, Hola, Europa!, and La Gent de l’Escala. After all, nationalism is a mindset, a
cultural construct, and ultimately a heartfelt allegiance. The documentaries with actual footage of
the day were an emotional watch for someone with strong ties to Catalonia. As one interviewee
in Dos Cataluñas said, the events of 1-O were “much more a question of the heart than the
head,” reflecting the role of nationalism as the new religion, the new cause worth risking one’s
life for, and bringing up the question of affect in nationalisms, an interesting research topic that
has barely been addressed.
There is a widespread lack of understanding of the Catalans’ claims, both in Spain and in
other European Union countries. The Catalans live in a democracy; many powers have been
devolved to their local government; they are free to speak their language, name their children
what they want, go and do as they please. Why are they so recalcitrant? Why do they endlessly
harp on the issue of independence and the oppression of Spain, even though the country has been
a democracy for several decades now? One interesting insight would be to bring in the model of
colonialism. Catalonia became a “colony” of Spain in 1714, a particularly harsh and violent form
of colonialism, with the elimination of the local culture and language, and this was reprised
during the Franco dictatorship in the twentieth century, which is still within the living memory of
the participants of 1-O or has been recounted to them by their parents and grandparents.
Catalonia was stripped of its laws and language both times, the ultimate violence against any
nation. Spain may be a democracy, yet few colonial outposts wish to remain part of their
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colonizer, even if it is a democracy, and any form of colonial coercion casts doubt on the
voluntary nature of that democracy.
Sovereignty is a common desire among groups who feel themselves united as a people
and is one of Anderson’s definitions of a nation: a group that wants to correspond to a
government and rule itself. Indeed, Anderson (Anderson 1983) identifies two factors as the
causes behind the rise in nationalist sentiment in Spain’s Latin American colonies several
centuries ago: “the tightening of Madrid's control and the spread of the liberalizing ideas of the
Enlightenment in the latter half of the eighteenth century” (50). These were precisely the roots of
nationalism in Catalonia in the late nineteenth century as well. More recently, when Madrid once
again tightened its control in the early 2000s, it should come as no surprise that this raised the
alarms among Catalans that they were heading towards a regression to an earlier, more
oppressive time. Seeing the Catalanists’ claims through the lens of colonialism, with Catalonia as
having been colonized (and duly repressed) by Spain, may shed light on the enduring survival of
Catalanist claims and fears. Perhaps if Spain could acknowledge this, reconciliation would be
possible. As Crameri discusses at the end of her book (Crameri, Goodbye, Spain? The question
of independence for Catalonia 2014), the way to resolve long, complex ethnic problems is to
“stop trying to discredit nationalist claims about the historical legitimacy of their nation… and
instead properly acknowledge the validity and depth of their national sentiment” (149). Catalonia
and Spain have not managed to reconcile these competing nationalisms in over 300 years. The
unanswered, and for now unanswerable, question is whether reframing the issue as colonialism
would make Catalonia’s claims clearer or inspire outright rejection of historical revisionism in
Spain.
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